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Like another Chouannerie

The counterrevolution betrayed: Count Bismarck and his consequences

December 29, 2020 by Nulle Terre Sans Seigneur

The reputation of Otto von Bismarck has fluctuated from the ambivalence of his contemporaries, to his canonization as father of the German nation following his dismissal in 1890 and particularly his death in 1898, to then being scapegoated as the embodiment of ghastly “Prussian militarism” and the predecessor to Hitler after 1945. Other than that, he is known for his handouts and his antagonism toward the Catholic Church. Oh, and unifying Germany, of course.

Few doubt his status as a paradigmatic conservative figure, however. It is a testament to how the world order he helped create (but as I will argue, was not actually that essential to, hence disputing his “Great Man” role) so thoroughly extinguished the legitimist cause that he ended up inheriting their legacy, with none of the substance.

The legacy of Count Bismarck has been, on the whole, a most regrettable one. The expropriator of thrones, the intermingler with Jewish finance, the gravedigger of Southern German independence, the executor of the Gotha party’s Anglophile conspiracy to steer Prussian foreign policy (more on this below), and ultimately the harbinger of the secular state via the Kulturkampf, which we will not discuss that much in this article.

Of Bismarck the man I cannot say much, and neither do I find his early biography very enlightening. A great many apologists and court historians have had differing views on his early political stances: was he a reactionary who “repented,” was he a progressive visionary from the beginning who was dragged down by his compromises with conservatism, or was he an austere realist who simply saw the “facts as they are” and made it his career to bring down Austria and the Confederation so that a proper German power may reign. The one interesting tidbit is his youthful infatuation with Marie von Thadden-Trieglaff (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie_von_Thadden-Trieglaff), daughter of an influential Lutheran pietist landowner in Pomerania. This may suggest an affinity with conservatism motivated more by transient passion than by hard conviction.

Gustav von Schmoller, a leader of the German historical school of economics, remarked on (<https://books.google.com/books?id=4SsRAQAAMAAJ>). Bismarck’s contradicting career, in 1899:

He was a staunch supporter of the corporative state until the 1850s, when he introduced universal voting rights. He was an opponent of the Prussian constitutions of 1848 and 1850, and then nobody contributed more than he to the consolidation of the Prussian constitutional order. He soon realized that self-government and chamber debates were indispensable organs of today's state; As early as 1853, he described popular representation as a "useful corrective for the bureaucracy that the cancer of republican-pagan education brought about, which in the long run would bring more misery to the country than the handful of oppositional rammers."

...

Bismarck as strongly as any of the Conservatives from 1849 to 1850 ridiculed and fought against the Gotha and Radical party politics; later he went in their direction and recognized the Gotha party as his greatest allies.

Bismarck was monarchical and conservative to the bone, but he never made it to the same ministry. He was ready to rule with the Liberals in the mid-fifties. Nobody has ever attacked him more disgracefully and meaner than his own cow, the Kreuzzeitung, with its Era Articles from 1876, with hundreds of conservatives signing themselves off against him as the Kreuzzeitungs-Deklaranten (<https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deklaranten>). Only in the decade of his chancellorship did he have a reasonably secure majority of Conservatives and the Center Party behind him.

More recently, the historian Otto Pflanze has described Bismarck (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1845577>) as a borderline Bonapartist, noting the unhinged threats of sparking a revolutionary war across the continent and arming national minorities in the lead-up to the Austro-Prussian War:

One circumstance alone would have enabled Bismarck to arouse the German masses for a national war under Prussian leadership: foreign intervention. During the crucial months of July and August it appeared that this might occur. To St. Petersburg Bismarck telegraphed that the tsar's insistence upon a European congress over the German question would force Prussia "to unleash the full national strength of Germany and the bordering countries." When Alexander interfered a second time, Bismarck restated his threat in even more forceful terms. "Pressure from abroad will compel us to proclaim the German constitution of 1849 and to adopt truly revolutionary measures. If there is to be revolution, we would rather make it than suffer it." But the greatest danger of intervention came from Paris rather than from St. Petersburg. Repeatedly Bismarck hurled the same warnings at Napoleon III, who demanded compensation for permitting the expansion of Prussia. Rather than cede German soil or part with any of her conquests Prussia would cross the River Main and use "every means" to arouse a national war against France. Should Austria join France in a two-front war against Prussia, Bismarck would renew the alliance with Italy and ignite the forces of national revolution within the Habsburg Empire. Prussia would conduct a "war of revolution," he told the Italian General Govone, "We would excite a rebellion in Hungary and organize provisional governments in Prague and Brann."

(Pflanze cites evidence of Bismarck maintaining contacts with Hungarian nationalists since 1862 and being ready to deploy an affiliated legion to thoroughly crush Austria had he deemed it necessary. This was done with the cooperation of Hungarian nationalist general Gyorgy Klapka.)

These statements were probably not mere bluffs. The memoirs of Carl Schurz, Forty-Eighter exile and later U.S. official, record an encounter he had with Bismarck in 1867. (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Reminiscences_of_Carl_Schurz/Volume_Three/08_A_Journey_to_Europe_%E2%80%94_Meeting_with_Bismarck). In it, Bismarck openly shares his idea to Schurz that had

the Austro-Prussian War went on longer than it did and involved a stronger French resistance, that he would have “under those circumstances... appealed to the national feeling of the whole people by proclaiming the constitution of the German Empire made at Frankfurt in 1848 and 1849.” Bismarck added that, “after all it was not so very far from what I am aiming at now. But whether the old gentleman [Wilhelm I] would have adopted it, is doubtful. Still, with Napoleon at the gates, he might have taken that jump too.” “But, we shall have that war with France anyhow.”

Certainly, Bismarck and the liberals had their common foes. Hermann Baumgarten penned the infamous “Self-Criticism” [Selbstkritik] of German liberalism in 1866 which led to the founding of the National Liberal Party and the start of the pro-Bismarck Kartell parliamentary alliance. Baumgarten vividly laid out the shared cause as follows (http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1832):

But to see how in May, how even in June, when it had been obvious for some time that a Prussian victory would have to mean the triumph of a liberal and national policy, whereas an Austrian victory would have to represent the destruction of liberal and national hopes, to see how they clung with few exceptions to the anti-Bismarck chorus, along with everything that was reactionary and anti-national in Germany – this was, I admit, one of the saddest things an upright Liberal could experience. **They joined in with dynastic particularism; with the small-state bureaucracies that had grown up in comfort and trembled in the face of Prussian discipline and work; with the petty philistinism that would perhaps like to see the number of German residences doubled; with that absolutely pitiful Junkerdom, which, displaying the right instinct in Prussia, hates the revolutionary parvenu; with those ultramontanes whose love for the Habsburg dynasty ought to be sufficient reason to sway any patriot to the opposite sentiment.** It was very sad to see how, even then, most representatives of a liberal German policy were still walking arm in arm with their most irreconcilable adversaries. It was a death sentence – with no chance for appeal – for the type of liberalism that had been customary in Germany up to that point. It proved that the party on which the nation had pinned its hope in the past possessed neither the political insight nor the strength that alone suffice to lead a great nation to its salvation.

[...]

The core of our German fantasies was particularism: it was bred in the bone and lived still. We hoped to become Germans one day, but we were really Hanoverians, Badenese, and Bavarians. The overwhelming mass of the population thought as narrowly as that. And even those who were sincerely aware of their Germanness, who deemed it a serious matter of the heart to oppose the indignity of the present with their utmost strength, were nevertheless bound through the force of real circumstances to the small special body politic to which each belonged. They paid taxes to it; they obeyed and served it. Where was the great whole for which they reached out longingly? Up in the skies! It was alive in their fantasy, in their dreams. They could sing its praises, give it thundering applause, and be enthusiastic about it; but they could do little or nothing for it. If an apolitical past pervaded by religious, literary, and private interests had accustomed us to confusing the simplest political questions with our theories and doctrines, then it was inevitable that the most complicated question of all – the German one – would cause a truly Babylonian confusion of tongues among us.

One of the liberals who was initially uneasy of the war was from an article by G.G. Gervinus published in the Stuttgarter Beobachter. A vigorous and revealing response (<https://books.google.com/books?id=3lZrKvHtXGEC>) was penned by a strongly pro-Prussian liberal, who stated that “by virtue of the facts, there was a kind of latent conspiracy between the country of Prussia and liberal Germany,” that “the misleading romantic Radowitz and the particularistic bureaucrats Manteuffel and Westphalen were

not the men to establish German unity. And certainly not King Friedrich Wilhelm IV." But that above all "Our liberalism is in the process of being transformed from Hesse-Darmstadtian, Nassouvian, Frankfurtian, Badenian, Kurhessian, Bavarian, etc. liberalism into German liberalism."

On a similar note the Manchester Examiner, a liberal English paper, gleefully noted in 1870 (<https://books.google.com/books?id=0MRll3MFJAYC&pg=PA510>) during the Franco-Prussian War that "...is there no danger for the Hohenzollerns in this policy of improving kings off the face of Teutonic creation? Hanover has been confiscated, Saxony turned into a shadow, while Bavaria and Wurtemberg hover on the brink of eternal night. The Germans will be taught by a series of examples how easily kings can be dispensed with, and how quietly they can be got rid of. Bismarck, by the very means he is taking to build up the monarchy of Prussia on the footing of Divine right, is familiarizing Germany with the practical lessons of the French Revolution, and already it is hardly premature to predict the future of Germany in the words of Lord Lytton — 'I see before me, looming in the far distance, the on the Continent' are calculated to make us examine into the Giant Shadow of the Coming Republic.'"

The "Giant Shadow of the Coming Republic" would indeed eventually show itself. The expropriation of Hanover, Nassau and Hesse-Kassel after 1866 were not met without resistance, however. A sizable Guelph Legion still faithful to their oath to the illicitly deposed Georg V would remain a prominent regional force for some time, but ultimately failed to capture the key moment of 1870-1. The above-mentioned threat by Bismarck against Russia to embark on 'revolutionary measures' was actually in reference to a request by Tsar Alexander II's chancellor, made to Edwin von Manteuffel, that the Southern German states have their rights restored.

Bismarck's opinion (<https://books.google.com/books?id=RSLeSLcMGucC&pg=PA9>) in 1867 was that "if they (the Hanoverians) join our enemies, although they have identical interests with us; if they form a State between Hamburg, Minden, and Cologne, from which we must fear that every opportunity to hurt us will be made use of, so that whenever we turn towards the South they will stick-I shall not say the poniard, but their arms in our back; such a State dare not exist with our consent; its existence would be antagonistic to that of Prussia, and the Minister of Prussia who would have an opportunity to get rid of such a Hanover, and would not seize that opportunity, ought to be considered a traitor to his country, a traitor to Germany." The presence of Guelph Legion troops exiled in France would too serve as a pretext, one of many, for the war of 1870-1.

Other dissenters existed especially in Saxony. The eminent Clemens August von Westphalen zu Fürstenberg (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clemens_August_von_Westphalen_zu_F%C3%BCrstenberg) went so far as to renege on his feudal oath to the King of Prussia and refuse his hereditary seat in the Upper House, later endorsing Catholic representatives such as August Reichensperger to defend confessional and local interests. Above all was Bismarck's reluctant nemesis, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, a Saxon and later Austrian diplomat who faithfully adhered to the German Confederation and tried to steer the Southern German states against the vicissitudes of Prussia and Austria alike. In his memoirs, Beust shares an amusing anecdote (<https://archive.org/details/memoirscount01beusuoft/page/344/mode/2up>) on the fortunes of Saxony pre-unification:

I was on a short visit to Saxony after 1870, at the time when Prince Bismarck was first attempting to make the railways of the various States an Imperial monopoly. This measure excited bitter opposition, which a National Liberal paper deplored with the words: 'This narrow, local spirit reminds us of the worst times of Beust.' 'Nay, it explains the worst times of Beust,' said I to a friend. In those times the Saxon had not yet the gratification of having conquered Alsace, but the Alsatian manufactories were not competing with the Saxon ; nor had the Saxon the gratification of possessing a navy ready equipped for war ; but the products of his industry were being sent across the sea far more frequently than now. He had not the satisfaction of being a member of the greatest military power in Europe ; but he enjoyed the harmless pleasure of hearing Saxony raise her voice in the Confederation, and seeing her Minister become a member of a European Conference. He paid for this less dearly than now, when he is obliged to contribute sixty thousand men to the Imperial army — three times the number that was then considered sufficient to preserve the peace and security of the country. And finally, he did not possess the satisfaction of knowing that if he were ill-treated at Buenos-Ayres, a man-of-war would be sent to punish his tormentors. Such a disaster, however, rarely happened, while he was often in a position to want help and support in Paris, London, and St Petersburg, in which case he used to receive from the Saxon Ministers at those places every possible assistance, as they had both time and means to devote to him. Now, on the other hand, the German embassy throws him into the common pot, where little remains for each individual, considering the multitude of applicants. Moreover, in former days, it was the direct interest of the Saxon Ministers abroad to attend to the wants of their countrymen, as they were anxious that the Chambers should not carp at the Budget for Foreign Affairs.

(There were various attempts to create a 'Third German' bloc of the middle states independent of Austria and Prussia, most notably in Wuerzburg in 1860.

(<https://www.nytimes.com/1860/01/18/archives/germany-the-conference-at-wurzburgits-results-thanksgiving-at.html>). Though it failed, note the NYT correspondent's comment: "Liberal men cannot trust such a union as this; and I have no doubt that the whole people, in spite of sectional prejudices, would prefer the consistent, calm protection and guidance of Prussia.")

Arch-conservative Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach pithily commented in "Deutschland um Neujahr 1870" that the end result of kleindeutsch unification (via destruction of the German Confederation) had been that "German rule has lost its authority in Italy and Hungary; is endangered in Bohemia and Galicia. The Germans lost the duchies of Luxembourg and Limburg. Germany is no longer bordered by the Adriatic Sea. Separated from the rest of Germany is Austria, the hermit kingdom."

Historian James Retallack notes how in Bismarck's Reich, politicians of the Conservative Party outside of Prussia were sidelined, and in places like Baden openly intimidated by liberals (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1430504>), who were empowered by the Kulturkampf:

Baden Conservatives had virtually none of the institutional support which their Prussian comrades received from local administrators, judicial officials, Protestant preachers, and royal patrons. When one compares accounts of political life written by Baden party chairmen at the beginning and end of the imperial era, one can appreciate the persistent effects of prejudices and petty acts of intimidation which Conservatives had to endure from members of the Baden establishment. These included disciplinary measures and involuntary transfers for any Conservatives who happened to be state officials; requests from the Baden Ministry of the Interior – citing the anti-Socialist laws! – for membership lists of any veterans' associations founded under Conservative auspices; court proceedings (usually unsuccessful) against Conservative newspapers; and public defamation or personal insult when Conservatives acknowledged their ties to Catholic allies.

In such instances Conservatives were labelled “Jesuit dogs” and “enemies of the Reich,” though one leader, Otto von Stockhorn, was once called “an orthodox-pietist full-blooded Junker.” When Stockhorn's brother, Emil, an aspiring state judicial official, made his first speech in parliament as a Conservative, a liberal deputy told him afterwards that “with your speech today you have shut the door to the state supreme court.” When another Conservative ran for election in a constituency that had suffered disaster due to Rhine floods, the state commissar for the district let it be known that relief funds would be cut off for any towns that voted Conservative. Prince Wilhelm of Baden, the brother of the grand duke, stood as a conservative candidate in the late 1870s; but the official press launched a stinging attack on him and called his supporters “traitors to the Fatherland, Social Democrats, and assassins.” Election day came and officials helped organize great “hurrahs” in every village that voted for the prince's liberal opponent, while in those that cast a majority of their ballots for Wilhelm, the announcement of the vote was greeted with “pfuis” and organized grunts. Not surprisingly, Otto von Stockhorn's impression of the Baden bureaucracy was extremely negative. He referred to it as pedantic, ill-trained, and undisciplined in comparison with Prussian officialdom. He also wrote that liberal notables in Baden made political decisions in an atmosphere of “beer and tobacco” and were fundamentally indifferent to religious principle.

But with all this said, just how much of the onus on this belongs to Count Bismarck the man? I would say not that much. He was not so much the Great Man of German history as the pawn of influential powerbrokers who worked without publicity.

As I was reading an issue of the *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* dated to 1862, I found an article critical of Bismarck which mentioned a fascinating brief pamphlet by an author dubbed “Carl Bollmann,” entitled “Ideem vom eine Reichsbunde. (<https://books.google.com/books?id=PRhGAAAcAAJ>).”

Bollmann's pamphlet asks why, during the Italian war of 1859, did Prussia not come to the aid of Austria and prevent the revolutionary machinations of Count Cavour and Napoleon III being realized, knowing that the Napoleonic principle of national self-determination would be destructive to Prussia's own possessions in East Prussia, Posen, and so forth. Bollmann answers that this was prevented by a secretive faction who had risen to prominence in the Prussian foreign office, and in fact names three people, whom we might call the “Guilty Men” of German unification: Alexander von Schleinitz (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_von_Schleinitz), Guido von Usedom ([https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guido_von_Usedom_\(Diplomat\)](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guido_von_Usedom_(Diplomat))), and Albert von Pourtalès (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_von_Portalès).

This faction is given various names: “Gotha party,” “Gotha clique,” or perhaps one might call it the “Anglo-Coburg plot.” It is a hazy and sporadically documented group of people, evidently having kept its behind-the-scenes activity obscure to a satisfactory enough extent. The plot can, however, be

reconstructed from memoirs and tidbits.

The name of this faction probably has to do either with the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynasty, a major patron, or more generally with the city of Gotha's status as a liberal stronghold. It may also refer to the assembly that took place in Gotha on June 25-28, 1849 (<https://books.google.com/books?id=okBGVVBCTUAC&pg=PA72>), which preceded the establishment of the ill-fated Erfurt Union. Either way, it carries certain consistent ideological cleavages.

A conservative pamphlet from 1860 entitled "Prussia's future: a warning," briefly mentions (<https://books.google.com/books?pg=PA116>) the 'Gothapartei' and von Schleinitz by name:

It is very difficult to guess toward what fixed goals Prussia's foreign policy is striving for; for nothing seems to stand firm but the system of an eternal vacillation between opposing decisions of hesitation, postponement, and transiency. After taking the place of Mr. von Manteuffel a staunch supporter of the Gothapartei in the person of Herr von Schleinitz had entered, the dusty project "Small Germany" was fetched from the archives again.

Ernst von Gerlach also briefly notes as of 1861 (<https://books.google.com/books?pg=PA11&id=H5tOAAAcAAJ>) that "Prussia has withstood the temptation to enter into a Gotha-Cavour policy," evidently a premature observation.

Leopold Friedrich Ilse, a liberal-conservative apologist for kleindeutsch Prussianism, remarks (<https://books.google.com/books?id=Z25GAAAcAAJ>) in 1867 that "During Friedrich Wilhelm IV's lifetime, v. Bismarck and v. Usedom among the Prussian statesmen most correctly appreciated the situation of Prussia in Germany and Europe."

One such barometer of the 'Gothapartei' view was English diplomat Robert Morier (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Morier), who had an influential hand in German affairs during the 1860s. He was a personal enemy of Bismarck on account of his means, but not the ends (to smash Austria), as in his memoirs he writes (<https://archive.org/details/memoirslettersof02west/page/68/mode/2up>):

Vienna, June 20, 1866.

I entirely concur in your wish to see Bismarck hung, but I do not, I must confess, understand your feeling about Louis Napoleon. Nothing can be fairer or more loyal than his manifesto. It contains the perfect diagnosis of the disease Europe is suffering from, as distinct from the mere ephemeral symptoms of Bismarckism and the like. The disease I had for a long while insisted on is describable only by the term "congenital malformation." His distinct warning to Austria that, happen what may, he would not allow his work in Italy to be destroyed, ought surely to stop the mouths of those who are for ever talking of his enigmatical utterances. That, if there should result from this war great territorial changes such as to alter very gravely the relative strength of the military monarchies of Europe, France should expect some corresponding advantages, is so absurdly fair that it is inconceivable to me that even that dullest of corniferi, John Bull, should shake his foolish head at it. As regards this war, the heart-breaking part of it is that its aims, as regards the anti-Austrian portion of it, are so thoroughly legitimate, whilst the means used are so thoroughly damnable. The presence of Austria in Germany and Italy is the fatal bar in the way of progress, first for Austria, second for Germany, third for Italy. I am myself convinced this might have been effected by peaceful means and by the mere natural course of liberal development. Bismarck has determined it otherwise. He has had recourse to a brutal surgical operation to effect that which, I am convinced, might have been done by diet and steady training. The patient will very likely die under the operation. But heartily as I hate the operation, I must wish for its success. A signal victory on the part of Austria in the present struggle would throw Europe back three generations.

And, in the same year, his Garibaldist motivations for siding with Prussia, his dislike of Bismarck aside:

Vienna, June 24, 1866.

As regards the case of Germany and the position of Prussia, that which people fail to see in England is that the real political force at work in Europe is consolidation, and that nationality is only the unconscious and poetical expression of this force. Englishmen understand the Italian question because they have a dim apprehension of this nationality poetry ; they, however, totally miss the fact that the real political necessity consists in the consolidation on the framework of nationality, and that this necessity for consolidation is just as irrepressible in Germany as in Italy. They talk of German dreams and Italian statesmen, etc. Now this work of consolidation cannot take place otherwise than through and with Prussia, for the simple reason (Prussia's enormous superiority in every political element apart) that Prussia is what Austria is not, i.e. soluble in Germany. **Break the artificial barriers between her and her neighbours and Prussia ceases to exist and in her stead Germany rises up ; hence, however condemnable the springs which set in motion the actions of Prussian statesmen, any increase of power and any success of Prussia remains a clear gain to Germany; however pure and just the actions of Austrian statesmen, any success of Austria's in Germany is a dead loss to Germany, and a fresh incision in the arteries from which Austria is bleeding to death.** The one thing for which, therefore, above all other things, I conceive Bismarck ought to be execrated, is his having by the impress of his own detestable individuality on the political canvas now unrolling before Europe so utterly disfigured the true outlines of the picture, that not only public opinion, but the judgment of wise and thoughtful men is almost sure to go wrong. I say this quite deliberately, knowing that if Bismarck succeeds the world will clap its hands and say he was the only man who knew how to bring about what the world, which always worships success, will say was a consummation it always desired. Whereas that which will be really proved is that Prussia was so strong and so really the heart and head and lungs of Germany, that she could, by her mere natural development *with*, instead of against, the liberal and national forces of Germany, have effected what required to be done by peaceful means and without bloodshed.

Another informative lead can be found in the memoirs of Baron Stockmar (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Friedrich,_Baron_Stockmar), a liaison between the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas and the United Kingdom. Stockmar's position was that an Anglo-Prussian front was necessary to contain the spectre of "Russo-Austrian" reaction, with his viewpoint becoming especially prominent in the 1850s following the Crimean War. "What does Austria want? does it want to force a nation of so many millions of Germans, to render her that moral subserviency, which she considers an indispensable element for the government of the Austrian State? If Austria succeeds in this, the necessary consequence will be, that the Germans will have to give up that development which their own character requires, and consider themselves as political serfs of Austria. Should Austria really proceed in this direction, Russia has probably a greater share in this policy than Austria. However this may be, I do not yet believe that Russia means to carry out such a policy with the sword ; and for the present, as before, I remain of opinion, that, trusting in the disunion, the weakness, and servility of Germany, it hopes to gain the victory on the field of diplomacy, by a mere threat of war," he pondered in 1850, again referencing the Erfurt Union and its preliminary congress in Gotha.

In 1851, Stockmar identified five main "allies" of Russia: "1. The friends of civil order, who have been frightened by socialism, communism, and extreme democracy; therefore, the Conservatives in England also; 2. Austria, at least as long as it remains in its present political phase; 3. The King of Prussia and all his Ultras; 4. The German Governments and dynasties, with very few exceptions; 5. The circumstance, that in France, all the so-called friends of order consider that war would be the most ruinous thing that

could befall them ; whilst they openly confess that the French would succumb before united Europe, and the latter would, as a guarantee of peace in the future, separate large portions of territory from France.” In other words, the entire who’s-who of conservative interests.

1854 and the Crimean War was the turning point, with Stockmar’s editor noting the balance of power at the time making Prussia’s position more favorable to English interests:

...According to a notice in Stockmar’s papers of October 19, Austria was then still very much in bondage to Russia. It had declared itself ready to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, if Prussia would join it; Prussia, however, had declined. On the other side, one cannot but draw certain conclusions from the facts of the Austro-Prussian Treaty of April 20, 1854, and, in connection with it, the Austrian summons in June and the Russian evacuation in August. If on April 20, after the Anglo-French declaration of war against Russia, Austria and Prussia advanced so far as to take the forced evacuation of the Principalities into consideration, and if Prussia promised to cover the rear of Austria, it is not at all impossible that the Western Powers might have persuaded Austria and Prussia to a common action with them, in the same sense, as early as the end of 1853, if only they had given them a definite prospect that, by threatening war on this narrow basis, they would secure the maintenance of peace. An essential condition, however, for carrying out such a political combination would have been unanimity and energy in the English Cabinet ; for England alone could keep France in check, which was using every opportunity of hurrying the Western Powers into war. Unfortunately the English Cabinet was not unanimous, either in questions of home or foreign politics.

An 1862 issue (<https://books.google.com/books?id=MKINeTskScwC&pg=PA570>) of the Home and Foreign Review documents the parliamentary configuration in Germany coming as a result of this. The Gotha party is described as described as pro-Italian, pro-French (at that point) and having some line of communication with Count Cavour:

From the days of the Frankfort Parliament, it was a dogma of the Gotha Liberals that Prussia had a right to the supremacy in Germany. The subsequent defeat of the scheme of annexation only strengthened this feeling, and the example of Sardinia awakened the belief that the time had come when it was only necessary to act, and when a bold stroke must inevitably succeed. In order to bring about this result, the Hessian difficulty was kept up, the Holstein question was revived, the Diet was reviled in every possible way, and the recognition of the kingdom of Italy was demanded, together with a closer approach to France. These were also the objects of the Nationalverein, which was composed of the most diverse, and not always the most pure, and was heralded as a lever to move the masses. King William, guided by his sense of honour and his principles of legitimacy, showed no disposition to imitate Victor Emanuel, and to take the revolution into his service, only to become its instrument soon after. In the ministry there was no statesman so ambitious or unscrupulous as Cavour, no man who was prepared for a coup-d’état or a civil war in Germany. But though none would go so far as this, they were not resolute enough to renounce the alliance of the Hegemonists. From time to time they secretly encouraged the Nationalverein, they sought to harass and discredit the Diet, they remained on good terms with the Cabinet of Turin, and carefully kept a door open for all contingencies, by which, in case of need, there might be an escape into the camp of the German revolution.

The diplomatic tools they used to further their agenda involved recognizing Italian unity, signing a trade deal with France, and stoking constitutional-liberal unrest in the Southern German states (Bismarck and Usedom are mentioned by name):

They are, moreover, divided into Grossdeutsch and Kleindeutsch, partisans of German unity with or without Austria; and they know that their democratic allies in the other states, especially in Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, are not eager for the establishment of a Prussian supremacy. They waited, therefore, for an opportunity for action. They hoped that Holstein, or Italy, or Hesse, would bring about a conflict between Austria and Prussia, in which all the German Liberals would be compelled to join them; meantime, they kept up public attention by pointing to the coming debate on the army.

The ministry, in like manner, waited on Providence; and having no party in the Chamber, relied on the expectation of active interference in the German question to recover the sympathies of the party of Progress. Count Bernstorff, also a member of the previous cabinet, repeatedly announced the intention of promoting a smaller confederation to the exclusion of Austria. **He reckoned in this policy on the support of the Queen and of the Prince of Prussia; and he was encouraged by the two foremost of the Prussian diplomatists, the minister at Paris, Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, and the minister at Frankfort, Herr von Usedom.** The former secretary of Prince Albert, Herr Mayer, now secretary to the Queen of Prussia, is an influential leader of this party. Professor Duncker, of Halle, now employed to report on public affairs to the Prince of Prussia, is another. **The Gotha party is formed chiefly of professors and high functionaries, who have much to gain by a wider sphere of action and a greater field for promotion.**

One measure, adopted for the purpose of defying Austria and conciliating the party of Progress and the Emperor Napoleon, was the recognition of the kingdom of Italy. In his reply to the notification of this event, Count Rechberg alluded to the notorious fact, that it was wrung from the King as a means of preserving his ministry. The Emperor of Austria thanked him for having so long resisted the pressure that was used against his resolution, and intimated that the securities which had been demanded in return from the Italian government were nothing but an empty form. A measure of far greater importance, and a more subtle blow at Austria, was the treaty of commerce with France, which was signed on the 2d of August. To France this treaty was almost a necessity, after the treaty with England. To the Zollverein it is an immense advantage. But it was so manifestly used for political, and even party, purposes, that an opposition was awakened against it among those who fear the ambition and the artifices of Prussia. It was intended to knit more closely the bonds between Prussia and the smaller states, and to exclude Austria from the benefit of the treaty.

The Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynast at this time was Ernst II, and he was indeed a major player in all of this. His memoirs (<https://books.google.com/books?id=VcHTAAAAMAAJ>), too confirm the Crimean War as a wakeup call requiring a view to the West against Russian "despotism," writing in 1853 that: "If, on the other hand, the German Governments were urged more towards the policy of the Western Powers in the great European question, and if, by distinctly attaching themselves to England, at least in respect of Eastern affairs, they were severed from Russia, the effect on the inner affairs of Germany could not fail to be soon felt. I therefore urged on in this direction, from my place, as much as I could, and thus succeeded, at the very beginning of the year, in taking some decisive steps in Paris..."

In 1854, Ernst II embarked on a meeting with Napoleon III where he positively noted the shared interests between Prussia and France: "He considered the Eastern Question a matter which was suitable for territorial compensations. He kept his finger on Italy, and on Poland, and declared the idea of a Scandinavian Empire to be worthy of consideration. He did not doubt that Prussia would have to be enlarged into Germany, and he looked upon the German Confederation as just as decrepit as the state of

the Appenine [Italic] Peninsula. And this man was now Emperor of the French, and was on the eve of entering upon a great war, apparently in pursuance of a conservative programme, seeing that, for the so-called integrity of Turkey, the lives of thousands of French citizens were put to the stake."

Ernst II also remarks on Albert von Pourtales' important role in denying a Prussian assurance for Austria's integrity in the buildup to the Italian war of 1859, consistent with Gotha party aims.

In the same year, Ernst approvingly quotes a letter from his brother Albert (the two were typically of the same political dispositions) regarding Austria's loss and the role of English opinion:

The English Government is a popular institution, and the constitution is becoming daily more and more democratic. Nations do not calculate; as masses, they cannot calculate, they only feel. Hence, they are not led by their interests, and still less by principles of, or deductions from, public or international law, but only by feelings and instincts. To these belong the feeling of justice, the feeling of liberty, and chiefly the instinct of self-preservation. Since 1817, the English nation has been striving for the further development of freedom and self-determination, at home as well as in Europe. Just as long, Austria has been standing at the head of all attacks against the nations, their freedom, and their independence. Since 1830, Democracy has been gaining the day in England, and French democracy is joining her. From that time until the Spanish marriages, Austria has been her pronounced antagonist on the Continent. In the storm of nations from 1848-49, it was Austria's cruelty in Italy and Hungary, and her harshness in Germany, which were continually being held up to the English people by Palmerstonian diplomacy, the Press, and the refugees. The Concordat and Jesuitism, coupled with the persecution of the Protestants, filled the cup to the brim. That Sardinia, as the sole constitutional and tolerant State in Italy, in spite of its sad position between Austria, France, and the Pope, has had England's fullest sympathy, needs no mention.

It required the immorality of Napoleon's and Sardinia's conspiracy against Austria, to vanquish all these feelings, and make the feeling of justice supervene to outvie them. This had occurred, when you were still here. Thereupon, then, Austria invaded Sardinia, and suddenly violated this feeling of justice, and transferred it to the enemy! Hence, all that was left, was the instinct of self-preservation. This is still strong, and incites to hatred against France. The Austrians, however, have now evacuated Lombardy, the States of the Church, Parma, Modena, etc. The Italians are giving vent to their sense of liberty and national feeling, and their acclamations of joy fill the ears of the English nation. What statesman could adopt measures to force Austrian rule again upon delighted free Italy? And sacrifice for this the safety and the peace of his own country?

All we can do, therefore, is to maintain the strictest neutrality. New facts are required to awaken new feelings.

With that plan sealed, the nationalist ambitions of Italy were given free reign, for a future Prusso-German kleindeutsch ambition to succeed it.

F. von Beust had noted in 1859

(<https://archive.org/details/memoirscount01beusuoft/page/190/mode/2up>) the pivotal role of Usedom and Schleinitz in this affair. Schleinitz was warning an English official regarding the intent to annex Saxony and Hanover in the future (seven years before it was made a reality), and Usedom was justifying the refusal to commit to Austria's defense by waiting to see if the present English ministry would still hold on to office.

Guido von Usedom's most significant move would come in 1866, however. In that year, he would send an infamous, consequential yet historically quite obscure telegram called the "Stoß-ins-Herz-Depesche," roughly translating to something like the "kick-in-the-heart dispatch." This was a note to Italian general Alfonso La Marmora that one, gave him carte blanche to invade the Austrian province of Lombardy-Venetia (including the comune of Mantua), but moreover encouraged the Italians to drive Austria "back to her last entrenchments and to her last resources," with the telegram acquiring its name from the sentence that "The blows that would then be directed against Austria would not hit her limbs, but her heart." In effect, it was an endorsement of a war of extermination against Austria, ultimately not being pursued only because of Prussia's unexpectedly swift victory. Part of this war would have involved deploying a Hungarian nationalist legion under Gyorgy Klapka (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gy%C3%B6rgy_Klapka#Hungarian_corps), which Bismarck had prepared but found not necessary to use. Explicit overtures were also made to Bohemian independence.

La Marmora himself would leak this correspondence, and records overtures (<https://books.google.com/books?id=OSOkAAAAAAAJ&pg=PA86>), sent by Usedom to arm such a Hungarian-Slavic army that would cross the Adriatic and attack. The full text of the Stoß-ins-Herz-Depesche itself can be found here. (<https://books.google.com/books?dq=Un+po+più+di+luce+sugli+eventi+politici+e+militari+dell'+anno+1866&jtp=345&id=Pn9MAAAAMA AJ>).

As to Pourtales, his conduct is recorded in an essay commemorating (<https://books.google.com/books?id=W2I6AAAAcAAJ>), his legacy. Pourtales is quoted as saying that "We have little interest in the assertion of Austrian rule in Italy, because this rule has never turned out to the advantage of Germany, neither directly nor indirectly, neither giving material nor moral progress. An Italy strong enough to be truly independent, able to secure itself against the anarchy as well as against the preponderance of France, which, like Switzerland and Belgium, served the to put a bridle on the expansionist tendencies of the French people and keeping it in check would be just as beneficial to our German interests as what exists today." In another statement, Pourtales compares Prussia to Piedmont, both states guided by a vigorous national mission and equally the natural rivals of Austrian court reaction. The writer of this essay (which was published in 1862) finally ends on a joyous note, eagerly awaiting the rise of a "German Cavour" to finish Pourtales' mission. He would get him in the form of Count Bismarck.

Finally, we must mention another detail, that of Bismarck's lifelong association with Jewish banker Gerson von Bleichroeder (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerson_von_Bleicher%C3%B6der). This relationship was the subject of a book by Fritz Stern in the 1970s entitled *Gold and Iron*. It is also given much attention in the memoirs of Friedrich von Holstein, a civil servant and ally of Bismarck who later worked to depose him, so gaining greater prominence in the post-Bismarck years of the Kaiserreich.

In an entry dated to January 14, 1884 (<https://archive.org/stream/holsteinpapersvo009902mbp#page/n87/mode/2up>), Holstein explains Bismarck and Bleichroeder's relationship as follows (noting how Bleichroeder had been of great help in financing 1866):

In 1866, just before war broke out, the Finance Minister Bodelschwingh announced that he had no money left with which to pay the troops already mobilized. Thus Bismarck saw looming ahead the day when he would have to send the men back home. Then Bleichroder suggested entering upon some operation with the Koln-Minden railway which would yield some ten million taler. Bismarck sent Bleichroder with this proposal to Heydt, who declared that he would be prepared, as Finance Minister, to carry out the transaction without parliamentary sanction. That very day Bodelschwingh was dismissed and Heydt appointed Finance Minister. He did indeed carry out this transaction and paid the troops up to the outbreak of war, and later received from the Kaiser in recognition of these services the order of the Black Eagle.

But most of the credit in the affair was no doubt Bleichroder's ; it does indeed atone for many misdeeds. In addition Bleichroder is useful to the Chancellor, much as the Jewish dealer who 'arranges' everything is to a Pomeranian squire. Finally Bl. administers Prince Bismarck's estate very well, but then every banker does that for a Minister-President.

The harmful feature of their relationship is that Prince Bismarck cannot keep quiet about politics when talking to Bl. any more than Bl. can when talking to other people.

(Bismarck was later quoted as saying in his retirement that "In the year 1866, he [Bleichroeder] put at my disposal the necessary money for war. That was an undertaking which, under the circumstances of those days, when I was almost as close to the gallows as to the throne, compels gratitude.")

There are also some more salacious stories

(<https://archive.org/stream/holsteinpapersvo009902mbp#page/n113/mode/2up>) of paying hush money to avoid a sex scandal, and Bismarck confiding his political tactics (<https://archive.org/stream/holsteinpapersvo009902mbp#page/n229/mode/2up>) to Bleichroeder in advance, even of state secrets:

I then turned the conversation on the Chancellor's journey to Potsdam (the Chancellor was actually on his way), and saw from Herbert's half embarrassed, half surly reply, that his father had in fact said not a word about it. The old man is quite right ; people who drink do talk too much ; but he should hold his tongue himself and, for instance, say [nothing] to Bleichroder. He informed him just recently that the Russian strategic railway to Serachs was to be completed, not in two years, as is generally believed, but in one year or less — one of our top diplomatic secrets — and that he certainly expected war between Russia and England within a year. Bleichroder, who has considerable financial interests in Russian bonds, and therefore in the preservation of peace, will no doubt pass on this information to the English. The English and the Russians, as soon as they realize that Bismarck 'expects' them to go to war, will of course be doubly careful not to do so. Bismarck will thus have frustrated his own ends.

Fritz Stern also documents Bleichroeder's diplomatic influence, riding on the back of being Bismarck's investment manager and personal entourage:

From 1868 to 1876, for example, Bleichröder rented an apartment in his house to Count August Eulenburg, Hofmarschall of the crown prince, with whom Bismarck had tenuous relations. In time, Eulenburg became a friend and client. Within the Prussian court, Bismarck feared none more than Queen Augusta, and Bleichröder had close relations with her Oberhofmeister, Count Nesselrode, whom Bismarck detested. In 1867 Nesselrode had borrowed 50,000 taler at 5 percent for three months. A year earlier, during the Austro-Prussian war, he had informed Bleichröder that the queen, “amidst general satisfaction,” had nominated him to the board of some war charity. Later he supplied Bleichröder with confidential reports. In May 1867, for example, he wrote that Baron Loë, the Prussian military attaché in Paris, had just arrived in Berlin, where he was likely to spread “evil rumors about French armaments” because “he seems to me to want war urgently.” Nesselrode asked for information so that he could counter these maneuvers. The rest of the letter dealt with his investments. In July 1867 he wrote from Windsor Castle, again about his investments, and added: “People here believe that the peace will last, although the domestic conditions here strike me as very serious because the social and workers’ questions must lead to terrible conflicts.” Three days later, he reported that Franco-German relations seemed to have worsened, that some people in England thought that the superiority of the Prussian needle gun over the chassepot ought to be exploited: “Whether under these circumstances it wouldn’t be advisable to sell my shares, I leave to your judgment.” He added that some Englishmen feared a revolution in their country. We do not know whether Bleichröder shared this gloom, but Nesselrode’s letter came precisely at the time when for political reasons Bleichröder urged Bismarck to sell his securities. Nesselrode’s letter is clear evidence, moreover, that members of the Prussian court thought it normal to use their political information for their own financial ends—and that they too regarded war as a likely depressant of the market.

The diplomatic corps in Berlin looked on Bleichröder as a vital source, certified by his access to Bismarck. Now that Bismarck spent many months away from Berlin, diplomats were starved for news. In October 1868, for example, Bleichröder visited Bismarck in Varzin and immediately briefed his foreign friends. The Austrian ambassador, Count Wimpffen, sent his government a full report of Bleichröder's impressions of the chancellor's health and dispositions. Bleichröder also informed the French military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel de Stoffel, who by virtue of his intelligence and charm had secured for himself a unique position in the Bismarck household as well as in Berlin society. He was a client and debtor of Bleichröder's, who tactfully refrained from reminding him of the outstanding loan. Stoffel transmitted Bleichröder's message to his friend Franceschini Pietri, Louis Napoleon's secretary. He first drew a portrait of Bleichröder:

"...an important banker of Berlin, correspondent of Rothschild and homme d'affaires of Bismarck. Of low origins, he has acquired, by force of perseverance and practical sense, a considerable position. He is the only Jew whom Bismarck receives familiarly, the only one with whom he is willing to dine. He employs Bleichröder as a hunter after news and assigns him certain confidential missions, etc. It is noteworthy that nearly all Prussian governments of the last 100 years have employed a Jew (already in the time of Sieyès) as a more or less occult instrument. Without being precisely an intriguer, Bleichröder aspires to play a role and to take the place of his precursors, among whom the Jew Ephraim shines in first place. Let me add that he is a gentle man, of kind manners, with whom I am in continual and cordial relations."

It was not enough to have friends in the highest quarters, wealth, influence. Bleichröder's social presence had to be publicly displayed. The world had to know that Bleichröder had arrived. The ambition for such a presence had been there before: did he not have the glittering example of the Rothschilds before him? All the world marveled at the elegance and sumptuousness of Rothschild feasts, where royalty and nobility mingled with wealth and talent and an old and a new world met convivially and perhaps to a purpose. To attract Prominenz and to entertain them lavishly was a rich man's dream. Bleichröder set out to realize that dream. His ascent was slow, and the higher he climbed, the less sure-footed he became. There was no want of malicious tongues to wag about his faux pas.

In light of all this, the Kreuzzeitung published an expose in 1875-6

([https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neue_Preu%C3%9Fische_Zeitung_\(Kreuzzeitung\)#Die_%E2%80%9E%C3%84ra-Artikel%E2%80%9C](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neue_Preu%C3%9Fische_Zeitung_(Kreuzzeitung)#Die_%E2%80%9E%C3%84ra-Artikel%E2%80%9C)), written by Franz Perrot that became known as the "Era Articles," causing Bismarck to denounce the conservative paper, and in turn getting hundreds of pro-Kreuzzeitung conservatives to sign their names as "Deklaranten," against Bismarck and Bleichroeder. When it became time to exalt Bismarck to the cult status of a Great Man after his death, this episode was largely forgotten. Not that such people carried much weight in Bismarck's Reich either way, after all it was founded precisely in repudiation of them.

In the end, however, Count (now Prince) Bismarck was starting to lose influence as both Wilhelm II and the National Liberals lost confidence in him. In an attempt to stage a crisis where he would rise again as the savior, he endeavored to forge an alliance (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637730>), with the Catholic Centre Party and the same Kreuzzeitung conservatives who until then had been his foes. This including organizing a meeting with Ludwig Windthorst, once regarded by Bismarck as his own greatest enemy. Bleichroeder gave his assistance. In 1889, in a prelude to carrying out said alliance, he gave the Bavarian Catholics a favor by privately approving the restoration of the Redemptorists as a congregation,

reversing a Kulturkampf motion. When the likes of Friedrich von Holstein and Philipp zu Eulenburg found out, they freaked over the spectre of “Catholic hegemonial power in the Reich,” and especially the potential threat of Bavarian separatism.

This was ultimately vetoed, and both Holstein and Eulenburg were hard at work to get both the Kaiser and the National Liberals to corner Bismarck, culminating in his dismissal in 1890. In effect, Bismarck fell the moment he tried to create a truly conservative coalition in a regime he helped create specifically to avert such a possibility — his Reich, therefore, was working as intended. In the last 8 years of his life, Bismarck embellished his reputation as the most patriotic of all Germans, to the swooning of many student pilgrimages, laying the foundation for his undeserved cult of personality, but later on getting him smeared as a proto-Nazi as time passed further on.

This entry was posted in [Historical insights](#), [Liberalism](#). Bookmark the [permalink](#).

8 thoughts on “The counterrevolution betrayed: Count Bismarck and his consequences”

1. Pingback: [The counterrevolution betrayed: Count Bismarck and his consequences | Reaction Times](#)

2. vxxc says:

[December 29, 2020 at 11:28 pm](#)

Great and interesting history.

But you are unfair to Bismarck, he was an 18th century minister serving his Prince faithfully and his Prince was Prussian. How long could Germany go on with the ridiculous Confederation? A proud people so marginalized. Imagine the 20th century without Germany- for the West it might not have been better but worse – or worse still that fragmented and frivolous collection of polities might have actually been taken by the Leftists/Communists. Russia was an accident. Whatever the Germans did do they also blunted Communism. In their hands instead of the Kaiser and then Hitler matters would have been worse, we’d have certainly grown up in a mostly Communist world to this very day.

Really you Bitter Romantics are the worst kind.

I was born Catholic, so I’m not looking for the lost Guelph Army of the Lost Realms of ‘Rome’.

Read Bismarck in his own words before you judge him so harshly.

[https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1099235W/Bismarck the man and the statesman](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1099235W/Bismarck_the_man_and_the_statesman)

Reply

◦ [Nulle Terre Sans Seigneur](#) says:

[December 29, 2020 at 11:54 pm](#)

If anything, my position on Bismarck boils down to “Bismarck doesn’t matter” and most of this article is about the people in his shadow who were doing much of the work.

I wouldn’t call myself a romantic. Though I’m certainly not a political realist in the modern international relations sense of that term, either. I’ve inherited a very specific dynastic and patrimonial conception of the state that doesn’t fit into ‘realism’, Westphalianism or anything like

that. True, many arguing for realpolitik would call that a foolishly romantic notion, but I'd beg to differ and I hope to elaborate in the future.

That Germany played an important role as a bulwark against communism, I do not deny. I'm with Ernst Nolte on that one.

Reply

3. fjwawak says:

January 2, 2021 at 11:09 pm

It's good to have you back. I am still curious where all this leads.

Reply

4. Aldon says:

January 10, 2021 at 8:35 am

I take it you don't believe in Great Men

Reply

5. Aldon says:

January 12, 2021 at 12:15 am

<https://swprs.org/q-anon-may-have-been-an-fbi-psyop/>

Friendly Whale Shark Jackson @TAJackson20 · Jan 11, 2021



Replying to @TheIllegit

"If they fought Japan"

I too yearn for such great anti-racist works as these.

[m.youtube.com/watch?v=PvcE9D...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvcE9D...)

Friendly Whale Shark Jackson

@TAJackson20

Claim the Europe on front if they must, but I will never let antifa get away with claiming the Pacific Theatre was anything other than history's greatest race war.

12:59 AM · Jan 11, 2021



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
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Friendly Whale Shark Jackson @TAJackson20 · Jan 11, 2021



Replying to @TAJackson20 and @TheIllegit

Claim the Europe on front if they must, but I will never let antifa get away with claiming the Pacific Theatre was anything other than history's greatest race war.



Howard the Whale

hereward the woke

@BamaExpat

I recall Admiral Ernest King making the argument c. 1942 that we had to prioritize defending Australia because if a white man's country was occupied it would start giving people the wrong ideas.

1:03 AM · Jan 11, 2021



3



Reply



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Most people on the 'dissident right', even the 'alt right' are former leftists. 'Dissident' leftists always end up submitting to normie leftists push comes to shove. Aimee is liked because she is a female sympathetic to the lonely males here.

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

They are not against BLM. They will add that it is a 'good cause' taken advantage of by 'capital'. Banal Marxists who will ultimately submit. They are least interesting people on here. They are liked by the DR because the DR are former lefties.

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

Red scare, well. I remember Aimee saying she doesn't think race is real so it explains that stand. The differences are plastic. There isn't much of a difference b/w a leftist and a liberal. Occupy wall Street and the Sanders campaign weren't subverted. That's just leftism.

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

Thaddeus Russell

@ThaddeusRussell



Quick question for the left:

Is the United States government an instrument of white supremacy, imperialism, and capitalist oppression or is it a sacred institution that must be defended against traitors?

12:31 PM · Jan 10, 2021



2K



Reply



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Friendly Whale Shark Jackson

@TAJackson20



That's the BAP position and, while I respect it, I find the sheer number of foundation/CIA psyops makes it difficult to say that anything besides liberalism itself could be considered to have unfolded "naturally" in the 20th century.

1:02 AM · Jan 11, 2021



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
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I've heard people say that Marxism itself was a psyop by the elites and many theories from a right wing perspective. Psyops are not reflective of the ruling ideology imo. Hobbes and Locke would be horrified of what they see today. I will say that the people who did the psyops

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

Unwoke Duffy 🇺🇸 @TheIllegit · Jan 10, 2021

Ah another one of these absolute ****-for-brains takes, well at least this is just a random twitter poster and not, say, a reporter for the New York Ti--

**Verv**

@VervTheVaryag

Grandpa fought in a segregated army unit for a segregated country that interned the Japanese... And thus is Antifa.

3:14 AM · Jan 10, 2021




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Unwoke Duffy 🇺🇸 @TheIllegit · Jan 10, 2021



Ah another one of these absolute ****-for-brains takes, well at least this is just a random twitter poster and not, say, a reporter for the New York Ti--



Gideon Travail
@GideonTravail

I always used to counter this one, but, considering that the US chose the Soviets over the Germans, I have to wonder to what degree those pulling the strings here were or weren't aware they were fighting for a Marxist global order just as modern AntiFa is.

4:29 PM · Jan 10, 2021



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From the foundations/CIA were more left wing than right. They just took over the foundations is all. Wanting a global managerial state is leftist imo. I'm not a liberal apologist, I just think psyops don't discredit an ideology.

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

Position for a while is that 'race isn't real'. I could say that radlibs are the natural end from Marxism like the way you guys say that radlibs come from Hobbes lol. I look at radlibs and Marxists like you look at classical libs and radlibs.

— Anton (@Anton56422519) January 11, 2021

China actually has an economy that works and a government that, more or less, works for the interests of the Chinese people.

America will be a Third World insane asylum where the state works only for the interests of the open borders Neoliberal elite <https://t.co/tbU9vsm6OF>

— Lord Keynes (@Lord_Keynes2) January 11, 2021

Nigel Carlsbad

@pompilivs



I remember you as a frequent commenter in economics blogs years ago, battling with laissez-fairists. Any major Post-Keynesian scholar to have shifted into national populism, or are they keeping to the shibboleths of their tribe?

9:40 AM · Jan 11, 2021



2



Reply



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Behind the scenes, yes, there are Post Keynesians who think wokeism is insane and would probably support some kind of nationalism

— Lord Keynes (@Lord_Keynes2) January 11, 2021

Nigel Carlsbad

@pompilivs



Ah, so it's still in the crypto phase at best. Not surprised: social democrats having to swallow their pride and admit that the red-browns had a point will be too much for them.

9:52 AM · Jan 11, 2021



1



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Nigel Carlsbad @pompilivs · Jan 11, 2021



Replying to @Lord_Keynes2

Ah, so it's still in the crypto phase at best. Not surprised: social democrats having to swallow their pride and admit that the red-browns had a point will be too much for them.

Nigel Carlsbad

@pompilivs

Their history is far too entangled with that of new social movements.

9:53 AM · Jan 11, 2021



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
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Wolfgang 🇪🇺🇩🇪🇧🇪 @Wolfgang18842 · Jan 11, 2021



Replying to @Wolfgang18842

Louis political beliefs fractured the Bonapartist Movement, causing more liberal Bonapartists drifting their support for other members of the Bonapart Family. Simultaneously, Louis attracted a large portion of disappointed Legitimists, Orleanists and Conservatives to his side



Nigel Carlsbad

@pompilivs

Interesting tidbit. Bonapartism as a movement is innately liberal and even proletarian, though. It was codified during the Hundred Days and later by Louis-Napoleon in his "Des idées napoléoniennes." Napoleon III was a unique

idées napoléoniennes. Napoleon III was a unique amalgamation of republicanism, socialism and empire.

3:51 PM · Jan 11, 2021



1



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So do you see yourself as leaning towards Keynes' work?

Reply.

o Nulle Terre Sans Seigneur says:

January 12, 2021 at 10:26 am

> So do you see yourself as leaning towards Keynes' work?

Not even close.

Reply.

6. Halbie says:

January 13, 2021 at 10:37 am

Can't it be said that he sustained an authoritarian state which lasted till 1918 ? Pretty good considering the context

Reply.

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